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Abstract
The bond market is affected by many of the same things the stock market is.
When insiders trades stock of their own firm, Investors take this as a signal. Insiders
are assumed to have an advantage by their position in the firm to know how well the
price of the stock is going to do. Insiders are also assumed to take advantage of this
information in trading for their account around the laws dictated by the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. When significant news is going to be announced about a
company, the stock price may begin changing prior to the announcement. This study
examines the bond market to see if insiders make abnormal returns. It was found that
there is some significant insider trading around the announcement date of insiders
trading stock at the eight percent level for buyers and at the five percent level for
sellers.
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EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING ON THE BOND MARKET

Insider trading has captured the headlines over the past several years with the
celebrated

criminal prosecutions of Ivan Boesky, Michael Milkin, and Dennis Levine.

They were involved in transactions where they had access to non-public information.
They were also involved with other people who had access to inside information.

With

this inside information, they made staggering returns on investments in short periods of
time. This form of insider trading is considered illegal by the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 (Gadsby 2-17). Insiders are, however, allowed to make trades of their own
firm's stock if proper disclosure rules are followed.
This paper examines the detail of what constitutes an insider, and what insiders
are allowed to do while trading their own firm's stock. The paper discuses how insiders
affect the market, both negatively and positively.

The purpose of the research is to

determine

between the trading of stock by

whether

or not there is a correlation

corporate insiders and the change in market price of the firm's bonds.

1

2

DEFINITION

OF AN INSIDER

According to the Securities Act of 1933, a corporate insider is anyone who:
1.

Owns or controls 10 percent of any type of the firm's outstanding
securities,
(This technically applies to bondholders but was designed for
stockholders (Schifrin 38))

2.

sits on the Board of Directors,

3.

is an officer of the firm,

4.

has the ability to significantly influence the operating policies of the
firm, or

5.

has a close enough relationship with the firm to presume an access
to non-public Information. (Born 40)

Insiders include those people who have the ability to significantly influence the
firm, or have special knowledge of non-public information about the firm (Fosberg 83).
Individuals sitting on the Board of Directors are in this category because they make
policy for the company. If there are any mergers or acquisitions in the works, the board
of directors makes the decision.

Officers are also privy to any information of mergers

or acquisitions, as well as have knowledge of the profitability and cash flow of the firm.
Top managers often have similar information on the profitability of the firm. They also
have a good feel for the industry and how the economy is affecting it. In addition, key
employees and technical specialists, such as scientists and engineers know product
innovations that are underway that even top management may not know much about yet.
Friends and relatives of insiders, although they are not associated with the firm, have
access to non-public information through their associations with people who are in the

company. The wife of Toys R Us CEO Charles Lazarus was accused of illegal insider
trading when she sold a portion of her private stake in the company to open a new office
for her business. Mr. Lazarus had just exercised a stock option a few months before.
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These two transactions were considered made by the same person because of their ties
through marriage even though they each had their own accounts and the trade was not
made in bad faith.

They are appealing the decision requiring them to surrender the

profits back to the company on the basis of having separate accounts (Giltenan

138).

As of spring 1991, insiders who have stock options must hold the option six months after
they are granted instead of the old rule where the stock must be held for six months
after the option is exercised.

Now, once an option is exercised the stock can be sold

immediately as long as the option has been held for the required six months (Saunders).
People who bribe anyone listed above include many of the high flyers who are
now serving prison sentences for illegal insider trading such as Ivan Boesky.
people paid insiders for providing them with the inside information

These

to make trades

resulting in excessive abnormal returns.

SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE

ACT

An attempt was made after the Great Depression to deal with fraud and
manipulation in the securities markets (Arshadi 30). Congress passed the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 for that purpose.

The act addresses problems through strict

disclosure requirements,

and through restrictions

insiders (Arshadi

Registered

30)."

on the transactions

insiders are corporate

of "registered

officers, directors

and

shareholders with greater than 10 percent of outstanding equity described on page two.
According to court interpretations,

illegal insider trading breaches the insider's fiduciary

duty to the stockholder as well as improperly utilizing corporate property for private
purposes. Trading in a fraudulent manner such as Boesky and Levine bring big fines
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A leak of an impending merger by the investment banking firm violates the
fiduciary duty to the client. It has been argued that instead of a criminal indictment by
the government, the proper course of action should be a civil suit for damages by the
injured party or parties (Bandow 37). During merger negotiations, so many people are
involved it is difficult not to have a leak of the impending merger. The directors of the
two merging companies are involved, two or three law firms, investment bankers, public
relations people, financial printers, and everybody's secretary (Keown 85). Bandowalso
says:
Insider trading is based on envious feelings, not economic facts. Most
insider deals neither wrong individuals nor de-stabilize markets. The
government jails insider traders as a matter of politics, not justice.
Henry Manne eluded to this in 1966 when he wrote:
Prior to the year 1910 no one had ever publicly questioned the morality
of corporate officers, directors, and employees trading in the shares of
corporations
Today an announcement that insiders are dealing in their
own company's shares is sufficient to cause an almost audible gasp of
public indignation. (Arshadi 30)
Public disapproval of insider trading prompted Congress legislation in 1988 doubling the
maximum jail sentence to 10 years and increasing the maximum fine ten-fold to $1
million for insider trading violations (Bandow 37).
Crovitz says lawyers and financial printers should be liable to their clients.

If

there is no legal duty to keep information confidential, there should be no crime.
An example, Raymond Dirks, a financial analyst, discovered massive fraud in a
large insurance company. He instructed his clients to sell their shares of this company.
He was convicted under SEC Rule 14e-3 because he had found non-public information.

The U.S. Supreme Court overturned this, ruling that since the defendant, Dirks, had no
fiduciary duty to the firm he committed no fraud (Arshadi 31). This ruling effectively
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said a violation of fiduciary duty is needed to prosecute.

Law does not require a buyer

to tell the seller there may be oil under his land; why should it be illegal for a trader to
sell his stock if he is the first to learn that the company is a fraud (Crovitz). There was
never any indication Dirks received his information illegally.
Another case dealing with the vagueness of Rule 14e-3 is the one involving
Robert Chestman.

The story starts when Ira Waldbaum

decided to sell the family

grocery store chain in 1986. He told his sister to collect her stock certificates.
sister had one of her daughters drive her to the bank to collect the certificates.

The
While

the daughter was doing this, her kids needed to be picked up from school. The daughter
asked her sister (daughter #2) to take care of the kids. Daughter #2 told her husband,
Keith Loeb, the reason for the car pooling. Loeb calls his broker, Mr. Chestman, and
told him of some accurate, definite but undisclosed information
acquisition by A&P (Crovitz).

about Waldbaum's

Mr. Chestman was found guilty of 31 counts of insider

trading of Waldbaum, Inc. stock in 1989 (Lambert).

Prosecutors say Chestman violated

Rule 10b-5 in aiding and abetting Mr. Loeb to violate his fiduciary duty. The Second
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals

overturned

the conviction because Mr. Loeb had no

fiduciary duty to his family. Mr. Chestman could not be convicted under Rule 14e-3
either because he had not been told the information was confidential, just non-public,
and he made no assurances that it would be kept confidential (Lambert).

The appeals

court judges said that, "after passing through several family channels, it cannot be said
that the information was confidential to any degree or was any more than family gossip
(Galen "Insider")."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, by throwing out the Chestman case, said
it would stretch the laws no further (Galen "Insider").

This is an indication of the
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ambiguity implicit in the regulations governing insider trading. Robert Chestman spent
11 months in Allenwood federal prison for a crime that does not even exist (Crovitz).
Regulators would like to make it a crime simply to know something in the market that
someone else does not. They are saying that, "If a passenger in a plane sees a big fire
at a firm's main factory it should be a crime for him to sell the stock short (Crovitz)."
John C. Coffee, professor at Columbia Law School, says this of the appeals court
decision:
Its significance is to limit the expansion of the misappropriation theory.
Under this decision, it can only be applied when the government can make
a showing that the defendant knew the information was stolen. (Lambert)
Theodore Levine, a Washington attorney, says the appeals court decision shows
"the clear need for the government to define what insider trading is (Lambert)."

Many

executives dealing with Wall Street analysts feel like they are "fencing on a tightrope"
according to a New York judge (Foust). Business must strike a precarious balance when
discussing their company's prospects with investment professionals.

The vagueness of

insider trading law leaves open the chance of individuals becoming "accidental Criminals" such as Chestman and Dirks (Crovitz).

Crovitz also says that the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals declared by overturning Mr. Chestman's conviction that not all of the
Wall Street targets of the 1980s were obvious crooks such as Ivan Boesky.

Congress

docs not seem to be interested in cleaning up the ambiguous insider trading regulations.
Representative

John Dingell, Democrat from Michigan, said in a 1987 speech to the

Securities Industry Association:

"I see no need to define insider trading further at this

time and give fertile legal minds opportunities to exploit loopholes (Crovitz)."
Michele Galen compares the definition of insider trading to pornography,
cle arly defined, but prosecutors know it when they see it ("Insider").

it is not
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Cases of insider trading prosecution include the case of John Joseph, a typesetter
at Business Week, who was caught trading on information
Business Week magazine.

from advance copies of

He settled with the SEC paying $30,000 back in profits and

a $14,000 fine. There was no admission of guilt, but the payment left him with a net
worth of -$15,000 (Abramson).
Dennis Levine started out innocently enough in 1978 when he met Bob Wilkis at
Citibank, were they both worked.

Wilkis had access to sensitive information

about

mergers Citibank might finance. As his contacts grew, so did his fortune. He eventually
ran into Ivan Boesky.

Their relationship

was one of many that Boesky developed.

Levine supplied Boesky with information for which he was supposed to be compensated.
Levine was arrested before he was ever paid by Boesky but his personal fortune amassed
through insider trading was over $11.5 million.

Dennis Levine was responsible

for

bringing down Ivan Boesky (Levine 83-85). Michael Milkin also was arrested during this
time.
Milkin was accused of "parking" stocks with Boesky (selling stocks to Boesky

while agreeing to repurchase them at a set price in the future). He manipulated stock
prices. He arranged insider deals in the leveraged buyout of Storer Communications,
the merger between Phillips Petroleum and Diamond Shamrock Corp., and several other
transactions (Bandow 38).
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MARKET EFFICIENCY
Should insider trading be illegal? Efficient markets require information as fast
as possible. Vague insider-trading laws hampers this information dispersion (Crovitz).
Insider trading increases market efficiency. Shaw says:
The originator of the information (the individual or corporation that spent
hard-earned bucks producing it) owns and controls this asset just as it does
other proprietary goods -- securities, real estate, patents, or copyrights.
This assignment of ownership and exclusive use is essential to encouraging
the production of additional information. (34)
Individuals do little innovation except when they are given an opportunity to share in the
value created by the innovation.

The easiest way for that to happen, according to

Ausubel, is through insider trading (1025). Insider trading increases market efficiency.
As is written in The Economist:
processing information.

stock markets,

The faster information

as all markets

are machines

for

reaches them, the sooner prices can

adjust to it, and the better they work. When an insider knows something the market
does not, and acts on the strength of that knowledge he moves share prices closer to

their actual value and where they will be when the news eventually gets out. As prices
move closer to where they should be, decisions on the allocation of capital become more

efficient. On this view, insider dealing acts as an economic lubricant. ("Cheating")
According to Henry Manne:
The insiders' gain is not made at the expense of anyone. The occasionally
voiced objection to insider trading--that someone must be losing the specific
money the insiders make--is not true in any relevant sense. (Ausubel 1025)
It is relevant to a few. Between the time the insider starts trading, and the time
the information with which the insider is using becomes publicly disclosed is relevant.
The line between points Po and Pi in Exhibit 1 illustrate the relevant time. As can be
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seen, the line connecting point Po to point Pi shows the increase in stock price as a result

of a series of trades by the insider forcing the price up. Point n is where the information
becomes public. Anyone who sells during this time whether the insider forced the price
up or not would benefit from the actions of the insider. If it were not for the insider,
the seller would sell for Po instead of somewhere between Po and Pi. For someone
buying, the opposite would hold true. They would pay more than the Po they would have
had to pay if it were not for the insider causing the price to increase. This buyer would
be the victim of this so-called victimless crime (Fosberg 84). This victim might be the
small odd-lot trader, or it might be a large corporation in the process of a buy-out. If
a buy-out were the case, the insider trader could cost the buying company millions of
dollars more than the takeover would have cost without insider trading affecting the

EXHIBIT 1
EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING
$
Pn

n
TIME
(Fa.berg, 84)
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market price. Though it might cost the odd-lot trader as little as a few dollars, the oddlot trader is still victimized.

The point must be made that the volume of trading by the

insider would have to make up a large percentage of all shares traded of that particular stock in order to have the dramatic effect on the price as seen in Exhibit 1. If the
insider traded only a few shares, or even a few hundred shares of a large firm, the effect
on the stock pride would be unnoticeable.
Trading on inside information can also make for less efficient markets.

Penman

says insider trading can capture the returns from generating information (480). Insiders
could generate this information falsely for their own short-term profit at the expense of
outside investors as well as to the detriment of their firm and their firm's image. Insider
trading effectively "taxes" the market forcing the average bid-offer spread to widen to
account for material information accessible to only a select few ("Cheating").
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INFORMATION

CONTENT

When insiders buy their own firm's stock, they are indirectly disclosing positive
information.

Insiders can benefit from the timing of trades.

impending "good news" announcement,

If they know of an

they can buy before or sell after the announce-

ment. On the other side, they can sell before or buy after a "bad news" announcement
(Penman 491). Their trading contributes to allocational efficiency just as "proper capitalasset pricing leads to the optimal allocation of capital resources (Ausubel 1025). "By
permitting those with information to take market positions in line with the announcement of that information, insider trading promotes the production and dissemination of
information
under-investment

This information

might not otherwise be produced

thus causing an

in information in the economy (Penman 480)." Efficient markets are

a result of quick accurate information.

Information causes pricing to be more accurate

allowing for the more efficient allocation of capital.

In Predicting Future Stock Price Movement
Research over the past has concluded that insiders can predict stock price
movement up to six months subsequent to trading (Jaffe 410).
In his thesis at the University of Pennsylvania in 1956, Thomas Driscoll studied
trading by insiders prior to dividend changes. Insiders buy more than they sell in the six
months prior to dividend decreases.
any noticeable

He concluded that the evidence does not suggest

speculative interest of insiders with respect to unfavorable

dividend

action. (Jaffe 410)
In his 1963 dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania, Hsiu Wu classified

months as net buying or net selling months. He studied the price movement during the
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month following the month of trading.

He concluded no relationship existed between

insider trading and subsequent stock price movement. (Jaffe 411)
David Rogoff, in his 1964 thesis at Michigan State University,
companies' insider transactions.

studied 45

He looked at months where at least three insiders made

purchases at the same time no insiders made sales.

Insiders of these companies

averaged a 9.5 percent gain greater than the market as a whole over the following six
months. (Jaffe 410)
Gary Glass, in his dissertation at Ohio State University in 1966, examined eight
securities with greatest buyers to sellers among insiders in a given month over a 14
month period.

He found the average return on these securities is 10 percent greater

than the return on the stock market as a whole in the seven months following the
individual months of intensive buying. (Jaffe 410)
In their paper which appeared

in the Journal of Law and Economics in 1968,

James Lorie and Victor Niederhoffer investigated the performance following months in

which there at least two more buyers than sellers among insiders of a firm. They found
that when a security experienced a heavy buying month, the price was more likely to

increase than decrease relative to the market in the six months following the event.
Conversely, a heavy selling month showed the security more likely to decline than
advance relative to the market during the six months after the event. (Jaffe 410)
Myron Scholes, in his 1972 article in the Journal of Business, investigated
secondary offerings which included many by insiders.

The residuals, the amount of

return exceeding that of the market portfolio, of the securities declined an average of
one percent on the days of these offerings. He says the residuals do not fall because of
selling pressure. He says the drop is due to the market's belief that the issuer possesses
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inside information of an adverse nature, but found no further systematic change in stock
price beyond the day of offering. (Jaffe 411)

Jaffe did a study in 1974 where he found that a trading strategy based on
intensive trading by registered insiders was able to outperform the market (Keown 856).
The residual return was found by Jaffe to be about five percent in the eight months
following an intensive trading event (Keown 856).
Finnerty and Seyhun did further individual studies in 1974 and 1986 respectably.
They also found that insiders can identify mispricings in their own firms and trade on the
basis of their special information. (Seyhun 1)
It might be noted that as time has elapsed, more studies have shown the benefit
of following the actions of insiders.

The two studies noted here that found no

relationship between insider trading and stock price movement were the two oldest. Six
subsequent studies have found a relationship.
because their sample sizes were small.

Those first studies were not as accurate

.

Following the lead of insiders will not always bring abnormal returns.

Norman

Fastback and Glen Parker in their newsletter, "The Insiders," at the Institute for Econo-

metric Research in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, conducted a study on mimicking insider's
trades for the period between January of 1985 and September of 1990. They concluded

that it was not as easy to profit from this "anomaly," as theory suggests, because too
many investors following insider's leads will dilute what used to be a way of achieving
above market returns.

Over those six years, the researchers gained an average of 4.9

percent, that is significantly less than the S&P 500's 13.5% gain over the same period.

(Hulbert "Insider") Many consider selling by an insider a negative signal. Selling by an
insider does not always signal trouble for the company. Insiders receive a part of their
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compensation in stock and stock options. After a certain accumulation of stock, insiders

may want to sell some in order to take on other investments for diversification of their
portfolio or because of liquidity needs (Frons 146). By the same token, buying by
insiders does not always mean good things because corporate insiders are notorious for
being eternal optimists on their own company (Palmer).

As a Market Timing Device
Academic studies have focused on studying insider transactions in picking specific

stocks, not as a measure for market timing (Hulbert "Inside"). Seyhun, in a 1988 study,
analyzed about 60,000 open market sales and purchases by insiders. The study examined
the relationship between market movements and aggregate insider trading. It suggested
insiders cannot always distinguish between the effects of firm-specific and economy-

wide factors. The insiders can only identify the effect on their own firm. Whether it is
a macro or a micro effect is of no concern.

Seyhun wondered if information

about

insider trades help predict future stock market returns and provide market timing ability.

Professors Wayne Lee and Michael Solt of Santa Clara University found recently that
the volume of insider activity may be a guide to market direction, but they found no
correlation between market direction and the ratio of insider buying to selling (Hulbert
"Inside"). This is an indication that insiders have insight as to the direction of their own
company, but there is no reason for them to have any more insight than the rest of us

as to where the market as a whole is going.
Instead of focusing on the insider anomaly as a market timing device, attention
should be shifted to broader anomalies of which it is a subset. The only one that lends
itself to market timing is the PIE effect (Hulbert "Inside"). Rozeff and Zaman point out
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that insiders generally buy low-cap companies with low PIEs while selling high-cap, high
PIE companies.

An investor would do no better, according to Rozeff and Zaman,

imitating insiders' buying and selling than by simply constructing a portfolio out of low-

cap stocks with low PIEs.

BONDS
Bond trading is not regulated like stock trading is. Illegal trading in the bond
market has not been established.

Insider trading in stocks violates an insider's fiduciary

duty to the stockholders, but there is no fiduciary duty to bondholders.

The only duty

to bondholders is the contractual payment of coupon interest (Galen "Junk" 57). There
has been research done to determine
relation to an unannounced
examines pre-announcement

the extent or existence of insider leakage in

merger by looking at daily stock price movements.

Keown

abnormal returns occurring on listed versus unlisted stocks

to determine if regulation associated with an organized exchange acts to deter trading
on inside information.

Registered

insiders who are active in the bond market and

insiders who are not registered are not required to follow the disclosure guidelines set
forth in rule 16a and 16b of the Securities and Exchange Act. Therefore this kind of
research can only be done with stock where registered insiders can be monitored.

There

are no registered insiders when bonds are involved. Most bond trading, particularly junk
bond trading, is done over the counter.
Another aspect of bond trading that does not exist in stock trading is the creditor
committees set up during a bankruptcy.

Unsecured creditors are appointed by the court

to negotiate with management for a reorganization which often is a restriction of debt
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(Weston 841). These committees are set up to work out a reorganization

plan for the

company (Lyons 92). The members of these committees have first access to inside
information on the intentions of the company.

For this reason, a holder of the firm's

debt has three choices. The debt holder may have an active part in the reorganization
of the bankrupt firm through a creditor committee, or the debt holder may trade in the
bankrupt firm's securities and sit passively while others determine the future of the firm
(Lyons 92). Many of the organizations with representatives

on these committees are

investment companies who trade regularly. The committee member has a fiduciary duty
to the other creditors represented by the committee, but the fund manager has a fiduciary responsibility to maximize return for customers (Lyons 92). This may involve trading
the securities in the bankrupt company.

The dilemma between allowing the trader

fulfilling a duty to customers, and the representative

on the creditor committee fulfilling

a duty to restructuring the firm was bridged by a proposal by Fidelity Management

and

Research Company agreed to set up a "Chinese Wall" to prevent traders from gaining
information

of bankruptcy

proceedings

from fund personnel

working with creditor

committees. Schifrin says the Chinese Walls can be awfully thin (38). R.D. Smith
brokerage business in New York, offered to buy bonds of a bankrupt firm a few weeks
before the company announced a plan that would offer bond holders a premium. R.D.
Smith had a representative on the creditors committee (Schifrin 38).
With respect to trading in junk bonds, former SEC counsel and law firm Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson partner, Harvey Pitt, says the cornerstone of insider

trading law "applies to any security listed on an exchange or otherwise. There's no
reason inherently that insider trading law shouldn't apply to junk bonds (Anders)." The
problem is that the Securities and Exchange Act was designed for stocks. According
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to the head of SEC enforcement, William McLucas, it is going to be tough on regulators
to determine how much of insider trading law actually applies to bonds.

Case law has

"been built up almost entirely in cases involving common stocks (Anders)." Trading in
junk bonds is difficult to track because most of the trading is done discreetly instead of
on an organized exchange.

Because of its relative ease, trading on inside information

is common according to Schifrin (36). Junk bonds are effectively the equity of highly
leveraged firms. A corporate raider can take large positions in a highly leveraged firm

without reporting anything to the SEe. The positions can be liquidated just as easily.
This raider can tell a company he owns a controlling position in the company's bonds
and the company can verify this only by checking with other bondholders

to see if the

raider os bluffing (Schifrin 37).
The effects of insider trading have never been studied to any degree on the bond
market.

The economy affects the bond market differently than it affects the stock

market.

When interest rates fall or there is a general decline in the economy, bonds

generally increase while the stock market falls. If the economy is optimistic or interest

rates are on the rise, the stock market generally increases while the bond market falls.
If investors see a firm's insiders buying, that is viewed as a good sign for the firm.
The price of the firm's stock generally increases on this sign. If an insider is buying, that
generally means the insider believes good things are happening in the firm. In October,
John Sculley and two other executives of Apple Computer Inc. filed notice of selling
some of their shares of Apple.

Sculley intended on selling 100,000 shares for $5.5

million at a price of $54.50. The stock fell to $48.75 by November after reaching $55
days before Sculley's announcement

(Jasen). This intent to sell came just before fourth

quarter fiscal earnings were announced to have dropped 18 percent.

Pennzoil's

chairman, J. Hugh Liedtke, sold 21 percent of his Pennzoil stock worth $2.9 million 1"1

weeks before the company announced a delay in its restructuring plans and a change
plans to sell off its Purolator Products subsidiary.

This new caught many investors

guard prompting analysts to issue sell recommendations.
that day. (Solomon)

~

The stock fell eight perce

A significant drop in earnings nearly always makes the mad

value of a company fall. Shocks like this may also adversely affect bonds by maki
them more risky to hold. If an earnings announcement

is shocking enough. bond rati

companies may lower the rating it has for the company. If the rating is dropped ff(
an investment grade to iunk grade. manvinstitutional
to hold the bonds.

investors will no longer be allow

This is due to restrictions placed on certain institutional invest<

requiring them to hold any i
This all affects price too. The increase in risk for no change in return will fOI
the price down to the point the bond yields the same as comparable risky bonds. TJ
is not a factor in the stock market.

The change from investment grade to iunk gra

also may glut the market when the institutional investor forbidden to hold iunk bon
must sell. this is also not a factor in the stock market. The maturity of the bond m
: something to do with the amount of change.
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EXHIBIT 2
Claims on a firm to be liquidated
In order of Seniority

1.

Secured Creditors

2.

Trustee's costs to administer and operate the bankrupt firm

3.

Expenses incurred after involuntary case has begun but before
a trustee is appointed

4.

Wages due workers if earned within 3 months prior to the
filing for bankruptcy

5.

Claims for unpaid contributions to employee benefit plans

6.

Unsecured

claims for customer deposits (maximum
$900

per

individual)

7.

Taxes due to federal, state, county and other agencies

8.

Unfunded pension plan liabilities

9.

General or unsecured creditors. Holders of trade credit,
unsecured loans, unsatisfied portion of secured loans, and debenture
bonds are all general creditors. Holders of subordinated debt fall into
this category but must turn over required amounts to holders of senior
debt such as holders of notes payable.

10. Preferred stockholders
11. Common stockholders
(Weston 842)
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RESEARCH METHOD AND RESULTS
The consensus among studies has been that insiders are able to identify
profitable as well as unprofitable

situations in their own companies in the short-term.

There is no such consensus for long-term results. This consensus has effectively refuted
the strong-form efficient market hypothesis.
The results of this study are based on bond prices where every study up to this
point on insider trading has focused on the stock market.

Since reporting bond trading

by insiders is not required by the SEC, there is no way to track that data.

Instead,

insider trading of stock is followed and bond prices prior and subsequent to the trade
is tracked.
The sample was taken by examining announcements

of insider trading in The

Wall Street Journal. Those insiders trading in firms not having outstanding bonds were
eliminated.

In the firms remaining, bond prices were recorded for the 10 days before

and the 10 days after the announcement

of the trade by the insider.

A treasury bond with similar coupon and maturity to the corporate bond being
tracked was recorded along with each corporate bond followed in order to filter out any
market influences on the price of the corporate bond. This process was to determine
whether or not insider trading affected the bond prices being studied.

Fifteen insider

purchases and another 15 insider sales of stock were analyzed. The results, as seen in
Exhibit 3, show the amount of excess return to the bondholders during the period before
and after the trade by the insider was announced.
abnormal returns right before the announcement

The study found that there were
of the insider's trade.

were more significant for sales transactions than for purchase transactions.

The returns

.....
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EXHIBIT 3
Buyers:
Bondholder
Excess
Returns

Period

-10, -2

0.69%

insignificant

-1,0

0.35 %

significant at 8% level

+ 1, + 10

0.53%

insignificant

-0.17%
-0.43%
0.20%

insignificant

Sellers:
-10, -2
-1,0
+ 1, + 10

significant at 5% level
insignificant

L

-
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The findings of this study are similar to those studying stocks.

In 1974, Jaffe

found the residuals increase the most in the first few months after the trade made by the
insider.

In particular, the most significant returns occur in the second month after the

trade which also translates into the first month after the announcement

of the trade

which can be seen in Exhibit 4. Jaffe's study followed 200 securities over a five month
period.

He lumps buy and sell transactions into one statistic.

when-purchased

The residual increases

stocks increase and sold stocks decrease (421).

Finnerty Studied 9,602 buy transactions

and 21,487 sell transactions

from 1969

through 1972. Of the buy portfolios, the intercept is always positive and significantly
different than zero at the 10 percent significance level. As is seen in Exhibit 5, the most
significant returns are made in the first six months with the first month being the most
significant (1146). All of the sell portfolios have negative differential returns which are
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level except for the fifth and seventh
months.

Unlike the buy portfolios, below average performance

of sell portfolios takes

place uniformly throughout the months subsequent to the inside transaction.

Finnerty

believes the difference in performance between buy and sell portfolios is one of two
reasons:

The first one is that the information

on which insiders are selling is not

immediately released to the market; and the other reason is the fact that insiders are
selling is not immediately discounted by the market (1146).
Penman concluded in 1982 that insiders time their trades relative to announcements of their firm's earnings prospects.

The numbers in Exhibit 6 are lower limits

because there is no record of insider trading in other financial instruments such as stock
options and bonds.

-
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EXHIBIT 4
Cumulative Average Residuals

Time Measured from Month of Trading Event
Length
of Time
(Months)

Cumulative
Average
Residual

Initial Sample (362 Observations)
1
.0060
2
.0118
8
.0136
Sample of Large Transactions
1
.0062
2
.0134
8
.0184
(Jaffe 421)

T-value

One-tailed
Significance
Level

1.93
2.24
1.32

.026
.012
.010

(204 Observations)
1.99
2.09
1.14

.023
.018
.126

Time Measured from Month of Publication of Official Summary
Length
of Time
(Months)

Cumulative
Average
Residual

Initial Sample (362 Observations)
1
.0087
2
.0027
8
.0070

T-value

One-tailed
Significance
Level

2.55
0.91
0.98

.005
.184
.064

Sample of Large Transactions (204 Observations)
1
~~
2B
2
.0134
1.67
8
.0184
1.36
(Jaffe 426)

.013
.047
.088
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EXHIBIT 5
MONTHLY DIFFERENTIAL

RETURNS

Buy Portfolio
Month
from
Trade

Monthly
Excess
Return

o

.0368

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

.0101
.0085
.0037
.0053
.0026
.0049
.0016
.0018
.0021
.0040
.0020

Sell Portfolio
Month
Monthly
from
Excess
Trade
Return

o

-.0090

1
-.0045
2
-.0043
3
-.0042
4
-.0047
5
-.0033
6
-.0031
7
-.0026
8
-.0037
9
-.0034
10
-.0028
11
-.0026
(Finnerty 1147)

Standard
Error
.0128
.0053
.0026
.0012
.0013
.0011
.0013
.0012
.0011
.0012
.0012
.0012

T-Statistic
2.875
1.905
3.230
2.972
4.252
2.440
3.832
1.433
1.606
1.808
3.369
1.750

Significance
.0420
.0731
.0042
.0054
.0002
.0200
.0005
.1010
.0951
.0675
.0019
.0891

Standard
Error
.0042
.0012
.0012
.0012
.0011
.0018
.0014
.0019
.0011
.0015
.0010
.0012

T-Statistic
-2.143
-3.750
-3.583
-3.500
-4.272
-1.277
-2.214
-1.368
-3.363
-2.266
-2.833
-2.166

Significance
.0403
.0007
.0009
.0009
.0003
.1581
.0438
.1173
.0019
.0468
.0421
.0398

I
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EXHIBIT 6
Abnormal Returns Associated with Announcements

of Corporate Earnings Forecasts

Estimated Cross-Sectional
Mean
Standard Deviation of
Abnormal Return
Abnormal Returns

Day

-40

-30
-20
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1

o
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
20
30
40
(Penman 483)

-.0002
.0005
-.0003
.0009
.0001
.0003
-.0006
.0009
.0003
.0008
.0021
.0014
.0092
.0017
.0017
.0007
.0010
.0005
-.0004
-.0001
-.0008
-.0002
-.0002
.0000
-.0006
.0000
.0008

.0233
.0208
.0231
.0230
.0222
.0234
.0234
.0244
.0242
.0229
.0285
.0250
.0334
.0374
.0254
.0220
.0234
.0223
.0214
.0224
.0214
.0227
.0232
.0224
.0222
.0230
.0232

t
statistic
-.36
.75
-.52
1.29
.14
.37
-.89
1.24
.39
1.17
3.12
1.99
9.49
1.54
2.25
1.14
1.51
.71
-.72
-.10
-1.21
-.35
-.33
.06
-.87
-.06
1.15

I

I
I

L
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Givoly found evidence that abnormal returns exist over the first 60 trading days.

According to a t-test, abnormal returns over this period are significantly different from
zero at the five percent

significance

level.

He says this does not imply illegal

exploitation of insider information does not occur. He does say the evidence suggests
profits from insider trading are no associated with disclosure of specific news. Abnormal
returns to insiders lasts well beyond the typical period of market reaction.

This is

c-

I

summarized in Exhibit 7.
Seyhun, in his 1988 study, examined whether publicly available information about
aggregate insider trading activity can help predict future expected market returns, and
whether the predictability

of market returns violates the concept of market efficiency.

He used 1.5 million insider transactions

over 82 months in 769 different firms. The

study found that net aggregate insider trading activity in a given month is significantly
positively correlated with the r~turn to the market portfolio during the subsequent two
months (22).

Seyhun said that insiders increase their aggregate stock sales prior to

declines in the stock market and decrease sales following increases in the stock market.

Rozeff, in his 1988 study, classified a stock as a buy if at least three insiders take
the same action with no insiders taking an opposing action.

Such as three insiders

buying while no insiders sell. This decision by Rozeff was made to reduce noise caused

by insiders making trades for diversification and portfolio rearrangement, not based on
insider information

(28). He found the same kind of anomalous results as have been

found in prior studies. That is, profits can be earned when outsiders act on the publicly
available information provided in the SEC summary of insider transactions.

It is also

noted that these profits largely disappear if a two percent transaction cost is assumed.

The same is true for corporate insiders leaving them with three percent to three and a
half percent in excess returns before the two percent transaction cost is assumed.
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EXHIBIT 7
Performance

of Insiders as Measured by Abnormal Returns

Period

Average
Abnormal
Returns

Cumulative
Abnormal Return

Std.Dev. of Cumm.
Abnormal Return

Buyers (1,118 purchases)
0-9
0.0175
10-19
0.0079
20-39
0.0135
40-59
0.0056
60-79
0.0051
80-99
0.0082
100-119
-0.0024
120-139
-0.0006
140-159
0.0008

0.0175
0.0254
0.0389
0.0445
0.0496
0.0578
0.0552
0.0546
0.0554

0.1250
0.1724
0.2294
0.2833
0.3389
0.3946
0.4537
0.5005
0.5628

Sellers (413 sales)
0-9
-0.0066
10-19
-0.0037
20-39
0.0102
40-59
0.0207
60-79
0.0038
80-99
0.0171
100-119
0.0077
120-139
0.0011
140-159
0.0111

-0.0066
-0.0103
0.0001
0.0309
0.0347
0.0518
0.0595
0.0606
0.0717

0.1169
0.1577
0.2176
0.2480
0.3140
0.3649
0.4021
0.4464
0.4975

All Transactions
0-9
10-19
20-39
40-59
60-79
80-99
100-119
120-139
140-159
(Givoly 77)

0.0110
0.0048
0.0126
0.0125
0.0047
0.0106
0.0002
-0.0002
0.0036

t-value

5.90
10.81
13.25

-1.34
.12

(1,531 transactions)
0.0110
0.0128
0.0284
0.0409
0.0456
0.0562
0.0564
0.0562
0.0598

0.1233
0.1692
0.2269
0.2742
0.3324
0.3867
0.4402
0.4863
0.5459

3.45
7.62
11.80
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CONCLUSIONS
Bondholders can make abnormal returns based on insider trading of stocks.
Insiders have been able to make anywhere from 0.79 percent to 1.75 percent average
abnormal return where our studyd found insiders able to achieve a 0.35 percent at a
ignificant level for buyers and a -0.43 percent at a five percent level for sellers.

The

significance is greater for stock transactions than for bonds. There is strong evidence

,-

I

that ensider activity affects prices around the announcement

date of insider trades.
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